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A RAND NOTE

N-3269-AF

**Southern Region Perspectives on
Security and International Affairs**

Ian O. Lesser

**Prepared for the
United States Air Force**

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PREFACE

This Note summarizes discussions with senior government officials, military officers, parliamentarians, and academics in the five NATO Southern Region capitals--Lisbon, Madrid, Rome, Athens, and Ankara--held in April and May of 1990.¹ It does not reflect subsequent events in the Middle East and Europe.

France, a Mediterranean country of considerable importance, is not included in this discussion as it is not normally considered part of NATO's Southern Region. French views will be treated in a major forthcoming publication exploring the evolving security environment in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean.

This "analytical trip report" concentrates on political-military issues (a separate series of interviews was conducted by RAND colleague Mark Lorell on the subject of Southern Region air forces). Both are areas of ongoing research conducted under the Project AIR FORCE National Security Strategies Program study "The Air Force in a Changing Europe," sponsored by USAFE and the Air Staff.

¹Interviews were also conducted at the Observatoire Stratégique Méditerranéen in Nice, and at Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples. The Note elaborates on themes presented in a briefing prepared at the request of Brigadier General Lawrence Farrell, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE).

SUMMARY

As the debate about new European security issues and structures unfolds, Europe as a whole is beginning to devote increasing attention to the Mediterranean as an area of strategic consequence. At the same time, the countries of NATO's Southern Region--Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey--are actively discussing the implications of the new political and security environment for southern Europe and the Mediterranean.

This Note summarizes discussions with senior government officials, military officers, parliamentarians, and academics in Lisbon, Madrid, Rome, Athens, and Ankara, held in April and May of 1990.

Although it is impossible to ignore the effect of specific national perspectives on issues facing the Southern Region, some areas of common interest and concern can be observed across the region.

1. **The Mediterranean is emerging as a center of residual (post-Cold War) security concerns.** The waning of the Soviet threat and uncertainty about the future of existing security structures have encouraged attention to regional problems in the Balkans, the Maghreb, and the Middle East, and at the same time removed the traditional context (containment) for addressing them. Existing and emerging security issues--the growth of conventional and unconventional arsenals around the Mediterranean, as well as security-related issues such as underdevelopment and immigration--have contributed to a growth in the perception of what are variously termed "nonshared threats" or "threats from the south."

2. **The importance of the Mediterranean to the security of Europe as a whole is growing.** The security and security-related problems outlined above will have important consequences for Europe as a whole. From the Southern Region perspective, this should argue for greater attention to "southern" issues on the part of NATO, the European Community (EC) and institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In reality, developments in Eastern Europe have already led to a diversion of political and economic

attention from south to east. In the strategic realm, Southern Region countries are concerned about the prevailing tendency to view stability and security in central European terms even in the absence of Cold War tensions, a particularly dangerous trend in light of the prospect of serious instability in areas such as the Balkans (as well as in the southern Soviet republics, which might affect Turkey).

3. The linkage between the arms control process in Europe and enhanced security is least automatic in the Southern Region. As a consequence of the actual or potential security risks the Southern Region countries face that are unrelated to the East-West strategic competition (as it has existed), there is a conservative attitude in many quarters toward arms control initiatives that might alter regional balances (e.g., between Spain and Morocco, Italy and Libya, Greece and Turkey, or Turkey and its Arab neighbors). Ambitious plans for modernization and defense-industrial development across the region also contribute to a certain caution in discussing conventional force reductions, despite the desire for a "peace dividend," which is as politically attractive here as elsewhere within the Alliance.

4. The U.S. presence in the Mediterranean (and the Atlantic approaches) continues to be seen as important, particularly in the current climate of uncertainty in Europe. The Southern Region countries share a prominent interest in the preservation of existing institutional relationships (NATO) and the U.S. naval and air presence as a stabilizing factor in regional affairs, as a means of linking the security fate of Europe's center and south, and thus as a means of avoiding the "marginalization" of their security concerns. In this context, there is continuing support in most quarters for the completion of a new base at Crotone in Italy to house the U.S. 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. Turkey, lacking the institutional alternative of the EC, has the most obvious stake in existing structures and patterns of military presence and cooperation.

5. There is a clear and continuing evolution toward a more "European" view across the Southern Region, with important implications for relations with the United States. With the exception of Turkey (and

Italy, where there has long been a European approach), the views of the political and security policy elites in the Southern Region countries are being formed in a European context to a far greater extent than in the past. Portugal, Spain, and Greece are unlikely to adopt policies with regard to U.S. access to bases in non-NATO contingencies, for example, that are at marked variance to attitudes within the European Community as a whole. Above all, this trend is taken to argue strongly for a new transatlantic approach to out-of-area cooperation based on a more active "European pillar."

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I. INTRODUCTION

These discussions around the Southern Region in the spring of 1990 were aimed at exploring three central questions. First, how are developments in Eastern and Central Europe perceived in the Southern Region, and what are the implications of recent events for Southern Europe and the Mediterranean? Second, how is the continued U.S. presence in the Mediterranean perceived, and what ought to be the level and character of this presence in the future? Third, what sort of security structures or political-military "architecture" can be envisioned in relation to the problems of the Southern Region--a transformed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC), perhaps a CSCE for the Mediterranean? Discussion on any of these question leads very naturally to an analysis of arms control, particularly conventional force reductions in Europe (CFE) in the Southern European and Mediterranean contexts. Indeed, this could be said to form a fourth and cross-cutting area of enquiry.

In the broadest sense, the rationale for posing these questions turns on the importance of understanding the way in which NATO's southern allies view the post-Cold War strategic environment and the prospects for relations with the United States, at a time when the region as a whole is likely to become more important for the security of Europe, and more important to the United States as a European power. The strategic importance of the Mediterranean as a place where U.S. interests in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East meet argues for a better understanding of perceptions among our traditional allies in the area as they confront a period of change and uncertainty beyond the unifying influence of containment.

As a consequence of the rapidly evolving situation in Europe, a good deal of the discussion reflected perceptions of the immediate situation in such areas of concern as the Balkans. To the extent possible, I also attempted to engage my interviewees in speculation

about the future security environment in the region (out ten years or so), including possible developments in North Africa and the Middle East. *It should be stressed again that this Note represents views current as of May 1990 and not beyond and does not reflect subsequent developments in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.*

II. PORTUGAL

A GEOPOLITICAL DEBATE

In a strict sense, Portugal is not a Mediterranean country at all, although it does have much in common with its Mediterranean alliance partners in terms of economic and defense-industrial development, recent political history, and areas of security concern. The pace of change in Europe, coupled with the need to address (again) the security relationship with the United States in the context of base negotiations, has stimulated an uncharacteristically lively debate in Portuguese foreign and defense policy circles on the geopolitical place of Portugal and its orientation in international affairs. Many Portuguese observers, to put it in somewhat oversimplified terms, question whether Portugal is predominantly a European or an Atlantic country. The weight of Portuguese history points clearly to the latter, and this traditional interpretation of the Portuguese role (it is a view more common in conservative circles but also shared by those who look to the country's longstanding ties with West Africa and Brazil) tends to support a close relationship with the United States and Britain. Yet the process of Portuguese integration within the EC, and the growing importance of Europe as "1992" approaches, argues strongly for closer Portuguese ties on the continent, including those with Spain, and the harmonization of Portuguese foreign and security policy with that of its EC partners.

BASE ACCESS AND OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION

Although the importance of Portugal's Atlantic character cannot be ignored, outside observers perceive Portuguese policy as becoming increasingly "European," particularly on the issue of out-of-area cooperation with the United States. There is a strong Portuguese consensus on maintaining close bilateral and Alliance ties with the United States, including the provision of important facilities at Lajes in the Azores (it is argued quite convincingly that the withdrawal of large numbers of American troops from Europe makes the Azores and

mainland Portugal even more important for reinforcement in a potential crisis). At the same time, the image of Portugal as a predictably helpful ally in out-of-area crises, common since 1973, needs to be qualified. A great deal has changed since the resupply of Israel during the October War. Portugal is now a democracy, a member of the EC, and free of the burden of a colonial war in Africa in which U.S. acquiescence was essential. The balance of incentives has shifted considerably and in ways that make it most unlikely that Portugal would grant the United States access to facilities in a sensitive out-of-area crisis *if its EC partners also refused to do so.* This does not suggest that Portugal has become an unreliable ally, but merely that Portuguese attitudes can no longer be viewed in isolation from those elsewhere in Europe. If a new approach to out-of-area issues can be agreed on in NATO, Portugal would undoubtedly be a strong supporter.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE IN EUROPE

As elsewhere in the Southern Region, the political revolution in Eastern Europe and the apparent end of the Cold War are applauded. From a narrower perspective, there is some concern that the United States and the EC (especially the latter) will devote increasing political and economic attention to the new democracies in the East--possibly even to the reconstruction of the Soviet Union--some of which will come at the expense of southern European countries, including Portugal. Apart from the potential broadening of the EC eastward (there is no enthusiasm for this in Portugal) the main concern is likely to be heightened competition for private investment. On the positive side, many Portuguese stress the country's valuable role as a model for the peaceful transition to democracy in Eastern Europe.

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

The "Atlantic" or "strategic" triangle formed by Lisbon, Madeira, and the Azores provides the basis for Portuguese planning. In a post-Cold War era, the East-West dimension of Portuguese strategy would focus on the role of this area for the reinforcement of Europe, with an

obvious and continuing interest in Allied control of the Atlantic sea lanes. The winding down of the East-West competition may also provide Portugal with a rationale for reconsidering its NATO commitments to Northern Italy.¹

There is a small but growing concern about the future of Portuguese relations with Morocco. Portugal has enjoyed very good relations with Morocco over the past few decades, but the increasing pressures on King Hassan, not least the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa, raises new questions. The issue of a "threat from the south" is more keenly felt in Spain where the existence of the enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla introduces a territorial factor. Portugal does, however, share the Spanish concern over the long-term consequences of the demographic imbalance between a "poor" North Africa and a "rich" Europe. Immigrants from Morocco and Algeria may not wish to settle in Portugal but will seek to enter an increasingly barrier-free EC through its porous border along the Mediterranean and the Portuguese Algarve.

Portugal's traditional wariness of Spain continues to make itself felt in certain areas, notably in concerns about the expansion of formal Spanish involvement in the air and sea defense of the Iberian peninsula (i.e., within NATO), and the rapid pace of Spain's economic integration into Europe. Over the longer term, some Portuguese worry about the maintenance of economic sovereignty and national character in relation to their more powerful and prosperous neighbor.

CFE

While supportive of the arms control process in Europe, Portuguese strategists and military planners do not wish to see ceilings on their forces that would interfere with the modernization of equipment. With regard to air forces, the Portuguese believe that they have an "understanding" on this issue in Brussels. The manpower-heavy

¹Portugal is committed to providing a brigade for the wartime reinforcement of NATO forces in Northern Italy. Under current circumstances, in which there is essentially no longer a Warsaw Pact threat to this region, the Portuguese commitment is anachronistic.

Portuguese army, a legacy of the colonial period, will undoubtedly be reduced in size over the next decade. As one individual commented: "NATO is now exploring the question of strategy and the operational minimum, whereas we have always been at or below the operational minimum."

NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

Portuguese dependence on imported resources such as oil and grain, together with the need to bind together security interests within the "Atlantic Triangle" (in fact, Portuguese naval operations extend down to Cape Verde) make unhindered use of the seas an imperative for Portugal. As Portugal cannot guarantee this with its own forces, there is a strong interest in maintaining the U.S. naval presence in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. There is accordingly no enthusiasm for naval arms control, especially if it is confined to the "visible" portion of maritime power (surface ships).

BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE U.S. PRESENCE

There is a broad consensus among the political elite in Portugal on the need to maintain the close bilateral relationship with the United States. The fact that the United States was never associated in the minds of the Portuguese with the Salazar regime, and indeed was supportive of the democratic revolution, has encouraged an environment in which there is very little formal anti-Americanism. This experience is, of course, in direct contrast to that of Spain and Greece, where American support for Franco and the Colonels, respectively, has resulted in a lingering mistrust of the United States in many quarters.

Just as influential Portuguese are beginning to stress the European context for policy on such questions as access to facilities in non-NATO contingencies, there is also increasing recognition that the U.S.-Portuguese relationship cannot continue to focus solely, even primarily, on bases and security assistance. To do so as the level and character of the U.S. presence in Europe is subject to reassessment, and security assistance declines, would be a recipe for disaster. The

economic development aid for Portugal flowing from the U.S. presence in the Azores is already less than that from EC development programs.

CROTONE

The transfer of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing to Crotone in Italy enjoys wide support among those interviewed, even in the face of political-military disengagement and arms control in Europe. The principal factors here are the general uncertainty about the security future of Europe and a desire to preserve a visible U.S. commitment to the defense of the Southern Region. Beyond this, as one observer commented, "if these aircraft cannot be transferred to Portugal under CFE, we would prefer that they remain in the Southern Region!"

SECURITY STRUCTURES

Despite the increasing importance of the EC dimension in Portuguese policy, many in the political elite and the military are wary of a European defense identity that would raise problems for Portugal's relations with the United States. Indeed, there is a strong "Thatcherite" faction, led by President Soares, that is quite cynical about the process of European integration in general (this view also tends to be associated with the traditional, Atlantic-oriented, nationalist approach mentioned earlier) and the idea of political and security cooperation in particular. The prevailing view is more positive, but far short of the enthusiasm for new European approaches to security to be found in Spain or Italy.

CSCE (including, possibly, a CSCE for the Mediterranean) is viewed with interest, but again without great enthusiasm. Overall, there is a sense that NATO has served Portuguese interests very well as has the security relationship with the United States. For Portugal, the evolution of a new security architecture in Europe will be viewed with caution, especially if it is perceived to undercut longstanding institutional ties. The Portuguese stance will, in any case, be a reactive one.

III. SPAIN

SPAIN IN EUROPE

The overwhelming impression one derives from conversations with officials and observers outside of the government is that Spain is now "back in Europe," and this reality shapes prevailing attitudes on foreign and security issues. The desire to overcome centuries of isolation from the mainstream of European affairs (and it was not only the Francoist experience that heightened and prolonged this isolation), combined with the exceptional fluidity of the political situation in Europe, has encouraged an active approach to European security issues.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE IN EUROPE

In the private sector, there is certainly concern that perceived opportunities in Eastern Europe will lure investment that might otherwise have come to Spain's expanding economy. Spain is also aware of the effect new initiatives toward Eastern Europe might have on aid and investment in such areas as Latin America and Morocco where Spain has traditional ties.

Political and intellectual elites have been active in promoting the value of the Spanish experience as a model for the transition from totalitarian to democratic government in Eastern Europe. There is a strong sense that Spain can play a very useful political role in this respect, especially in the context of EC initiatives in the east. Formal broadening of the EC eastward is not, however, greeted with enthusiasm.

Spanish public opinion has been strongly in favor of German reunification. This is, perhaps, to be explained by (1) the lack of experience of German aggression, (2) the process of reunification as concrete evidence of East-West detente, and (3) the desire for a more confident Germany as a counter to France within the EC.¹

¹The last point is an accepted interpretation, but I would have thought that a sufficient counterweight existed before the move for reunification. Moreover, it cannot really be in the Spanish interest to encourage the evolution of a Community dominated by Germany.

REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

The Spanish perception of a Soviet threat, always fairly diffuse (except in its ideological dimension as seen from the Spanish right) has, as elsewhere, virtually disappeared. In certain quarters, notably in the military and in conservative circles, its place has been taken by the notion of a "threat from the south"--that is, North Africa, and more specifically, Morocco. The existence of the Spanish enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla gives this concept a concrete flavor that cannot be sensed elsewhere in Southern Europe where military and demographic concerns emanating from the Maghreb also loom large. In Socialist circles, concerns are with problems of political and economic underdevelopment across the Mediterranean, rather than direct security challenges. In either case, Spanish policymakers are clearly beginning to think seriously about regional security in the western Mediterranean, whether narrowly or broadly defined.

For the Spanish Army, much more than for the other services, the issue of force projection is receiving new attention. Again, the requirement for rapid intervention forces, on the French pattern, is described in terms of the "nonshared threat"--contingencies in North Africa. No precise scenarios are offered, apart from a potential crisis over Ceuta and Melilla (to this one might add a vague worry about the Canary Islands in light of statements by the Organization of African States that the archipelago should be considered African). The other services are less enthusiastic about the force projection mission, largely because they would be called on to provide the air and sealift.²

²Advocates of a more active external mission and force structure for the Army are, in some cases, motivated by the concern in post-Franco Spain about the domestic political consequences of an Army that lacks a modern, external orientation.

IMMIGRATION

To date, Spain has experienced little of the divisive debate on immigration from North Africa that has become a politically important factor in France and Italy. To some extent, this can be explained by Spain's position as a conduit rather than a destination for economic migrants to the EC. To the extent that this situation changes--and it is changing as Spain continues to move toward a level of prosperity on a par with its northern European neighbors--the potential for immigration becoming a potent political issue will grow. Already, there is some concern that EC restrictions will compel Spain to take a harder line on immigration, with unforeseeable consequences for Spain's relations with Morocco. In the background is the fear that a fundamentalist or radicalized post-Hassan regime might use a crack-down on immigration as an excuse to threaten Ceuta and Melilla. The essential point is that immigration is increasingly being viewed as a security-related issue.

BASES AND OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION

As in Portugal, the prospect of large-scale reductions in the American presence in Europe and the residual need for reinforcement are cited as factors working to assure the continued strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula, the western approaches to the Mediterranean, and such bases as Rota. Having negotiated the departure of U.S. forces from the air base at Torrejon, the Spanish government apparently has no desire for further reductions in the U.S. presence in Spain. With regard to Europe as a whole, the consensus position might be described as favoring a continued American presence, but at a minimum level. There is substantial support for the provision of facilities where interests coincide (in the NATO context, ironically a growing political interest for Spain, even as the East-West competition wanes), but the prospects for U.S. access to facilities and overflight in non-NATO contingencies are remote in the absence of a Europe-wide consensus. In this context, the U.S. intervention in Panama has had a distinctly negative effect on Spanish public opinion. The area in which Spain has a natural interest in promoting coalition deterrence out-of-area, North

Africa, poses a particular problem. Raising the issue of Ceuta and Melilla in an EC or NATO context tends to have the undesirable effect of legitimizing the British position on Gibraltar. Nonetheless, the most satisfactory approach to out-of-area questions from the Spanish perspective would emphasize cooperation within NATO or the EC, rather than simply the bilateral relationship with the United States.

TORREJON EXTENSION

There is a general perception in Spain (and indeed elsewhere) that there can be very little possibility of extending the arrangement for the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing at Torrejon as an interim measure while the base at Crotone in Italy is completed. Some influential and well-informed observers suggest that there might actually be a prospect for extension if (1) Crotone is seen to be moving ahead; (2) NATO, and preferably Italy, makes the request; and (3) the extension agreement reaffirms the departure of the 401st. One should also be prepared for a Spanish request for "compensation" of some sort, although there can be little Spanish interest in pushing this too far. On the whole, the Gonzalez government may have more room for maneuver on this issue than is usually imagined. The apparent inactivity of the government in reminding the Spanish public of the impending departure of the wing from Torrejon may be an indication that an extension request is anticipated. Many Spaniards did not quite believe that the United States would reduce its military presence in Spain; there is now a grudging acknowledgment in many quarters that the new arrangement is working.

ARMS CONTROL

The Socialist government has enthusiastically embraced the prospect of conventional force reductions and favors the progressive reduction of the remaining nuclear forces in Europe.³ Overall, the demilitarization of relations in Europe is seen to offer greater scope for countries like

³Spain has had a longstanding policy against the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory. This has not, however, prevented Spanish participation in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group since 1986.

Spain whose comparative advantage is in the political sphere. There is also more enthusiasm than elsewhere in the Southern Region on the topic of naval arms control and confidence building measures (Spanish proponents of naval arms control would, of course, also like to see these measures extended to the Mediterranean region as a whole, not just in the East-West context). At the *political* level Spain is convinced that naval arms control in some form is on the horizon and can make a contribution to security.

SECURITY STRUCTURES

Apart from a rather belated (in the grand-historic sense) interest in promoting the Spanish role in NATO, the thrust of Spanish policy is now on supporting the development of political and security cooperation within the EC and touting the idea of a "CSCE for the Mediterranean" (CSCM). The latter, first outlined by the Spanish representative at the Open Skies conference in Ottawa and elaborated upon since by Prime Minister Gonzalez, would ideally constitute a Mediterranean Act, paralleling Helsinki. A CSCM would have two broad purposes: promoting political and economic development ("Europe cannot afford to have the Southern Region as a frontier, with poverty and instability to the south"); and cooperation on security matters, with France, Spain, and Italy as the principal players.

The notion of a CSCM is clearly very much in its formative stages. Initial measures might include (voluntary?) confidence-building measures, to be followed by arms control, possibly naval arms control, at a later stage. Apart from Italy and France, where there is also some enthusiasm for this approach based on the sensible idea that the CSCE process must not be focussed entirely on central Europe, CSCM is widely regarded as a nonstarter.* One of the most difficult issues--and even

*More recently, France and Italy have promoted an alternative concept for "Western Mediterranean Cooperation" centering on a dialogue between the four Western Mediterranean EC countries (Portugal included) and the Arab Union of the Maghreb. Unlike the CSCM proposal, the Franco-Italian initiative is essentially economic and political and is less concerned with security issues per se.

its most ardent Spanish proponents admit this--will be that of membership. The prevailing view is that CSCM should embrace the Mediterranean basin, to include such countries as Jordan and Mauretania that do not border on the Mediterranean but do have Mediterranean interests. The initiative could easily founder through too close an association with Middle Eastern issues (on membership, for example), and this suggests that the focus will remain in the western Mediterranean.

IV. ITALY

IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

The Italian position on German reunification, or more precisely the position of Prime Minister Andreotti and Foreign Minister De Michelis, has evolved from pronounced caution to acceptance and even encouragement. There is, of course, continuing concern that the balance in the EC will be disturbed by reunification, a development that would threaten the strong Italian preference for deeper integration within a community of equals. Overall, the Italian private sector still looks forward to "1992" with considerable optimism. Above all, Italy has responded to the prospect of a united Germany with a renewed call for rapid European integration.

In Eastern Europe, it is has become increasingly difficult for Italy to maintain its traditional role as a unique interlocutor between East and West; everyone can now play this game, and the extent of one's resources rather than the character of one's ideology has become the most important factor. Clearly, Italy still has an important role to play, and Italian enterprises are active in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Italy is the Soviet Union's second most important joint venture partner after West Germany), but there is a growing interest in EC-led development schemes for Eastern Europe. Italy is cautious on the subject of broadening the EC, continuing to prefer an inner circle of the "12," with others in some form of association. An exception would be Austria, whose application for EC membership Italy supports.

In the security realm, the waning of the East-West military confrontation and the de facto disintegration of the Warsaw Pact has removed the direct military threat to Italy in the northeast. Coupled with longstanding security and security-related problems to the south this suggests a progressive reorientation of strategy and forces toward the Mediterranean and a relative increase in the budget share for naval and air forces.¹ The net result is likely to be a redirection of

¹Indeed, this trend has been evident for several years and was explicitly articulated in the Italian 1985 Defense White Paper.

existing (or more likely reduced) resources, as the budget deficit and the desire for a "peace dividend" make themselves felt.

NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

The expansion of conventional and unconventional arsenals in North Africa and the Middle East troubles Italian policymakers and observers, and has done so for some time. Even before the current process of detente and disengagement in Europe, Italian strategic attention had begun to focus on the "threat to the south." Libya is the most obvious source of difficulty, especially in light of the chemical threat coupled with delivery systems of increasing range; but the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and the broader problems of political instability, population growth, and underdevelopment in North Africa are also sources of worry.

To the extent that the immigration issue becomes more prominent in Italian politics, and it has already been a significant factor in local and regional elections, the pressure for further restrictions on immigration from North Africa will grow. As in Spain, pressure from elsewhere in the EC will also be a factor that will influence Italy's relations across the Mediterranean. To take a prominent example, Italy has a clear interest in promoting prosperity in Tunisia to stem the already large influx of Tunisian workers. The potential role of the Italian navy in interdicting illegal immigrants from North Africa has been raised in political circles but, not surprisingly, there is little enthusiasm for this mission in the military.

The Italian stake in sea control in the Mediterranean will continue to grow as an increasing proportion of Europe's oil arrives through pipelines terminating in Turkey or through Suez, rather than via Hormuz and the Cape route. An appreciation of this trend plays a role in Italian attitudes toward the future of the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean, as well as multilateral approaches to out-of-area issues.²

²In this context, it is notable that the Italian Navy (the region's strongest) has largely replaced the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Central Mediterranean.

THE BALKANS

The prospect of further instability in the Balkans is taken very seriously at the Foreign Ministry and elsewhere. Above all, there is a fear that, in the worst case, a disintegration of the political arrangement in Yugoslavia will lead to a period of turmoil and lawlessness in the Adriatic region, including a potentially large flow of refugees from Slovenia. Over the longer term, most observers are reasonably optimistic about the prospects for stability and development in the region. Italy can play a helpful role in this regard, especially in Yugoslavia and Albania, but it is not really in a position to mediate on its own.

It is very difficult to envision an Italian intervention to restore order in the Balkans outside of a coalition (EC, NATO, or even CSCE) context. Italy's unfortunate history of military involvement in the Adriatic region plays a subtle but important role in perceptions on both sides.

THE PENTAGONAL INITIATIVE

Foreign Minister De Michelis has been very keen to promote the idea of regional economic and political cooperation among Italy, Hungary, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Apart from its specific regional merits (e.g., improving transport and communication ties) the initiative serves the broader purpose of creating an additional forum for Italian activity on the political scene. The pentagonal association could also act as a counter to German economic and political domination in northeastern Europe.

ATLANTIC RELATIONS

The prospect of German reunification and uncertainty regarding the general political and security future of Europe has if anything reinforced the transatlantic dimension of Italian policy. Europe may be the focus of Italian foreign policy activism, but the political elite is very well aware of the necessity of maintaining a balanced stance. This manifests itself in continued support for a substantial level of U.S. military presence and political engagement in Europe.

OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION

In the view of most Italian observers, it is improbable that any formal change will be seen in NATO on this issue.³ There will, however, certainly be an increasing role for the Alliance in political matters, inevitably leading to involvement in Mediterranean affairs, much of which will be outside the formal purview of the Alliance. A wider consultative role for NATO on out-of-area policy is favored, but Italian officials are also wary of jeopardizing the very favorable attitude toward NATO in public opinion by introducing controversial issues of intervention outside Europe. Other avenues for cooperation, particularly attractive in the event of a substantial draw-down of the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean, would be through the EC or the Western European Union (WEU) (as in the Gulf), or joint initiatives in the Western Mediterranean with France and Spain.⁴

CROTONE

Security concerns in the Mediterranean also dictate support for the U.S. presence, which has traditionally bound together the security interests not only of the United States and Europe but also of central and northern Europe and the south. The perceived unpredictability of the U.S. budget process and the possibility of future naval arms control initiatives lead to an additional Italian interest in seeing a "balanced" (i.e., air/sea) presence in the Mediterranean. One consequence of this has been marked support for the completion of the air base at Crotone intended to house the 72 F-16s of the U.S. 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, scheduled to leave Spain in the spring of 1992. Whereas only a few months ago one could speculate on the willingness of the Italian government to envision a halt to the Crotone project in the face of arms control and detente (the "two-track" approach), the current outlook is more positive. The key but scarcely articulated element here

³Again, this reflects views current in the spring of 1990, before the invasion of Kuwait.

⁴Trilateral cooperation of this sort already exists in the area of maritime surveillance (e.g., the Helios satellite project).

is the perceived role of a U.S. air presence in the region in deterring Libyan aggression. Finally, the withdrawal of U.S. ground-based nuclear systems from Europe has given the Italians and others in the Southern Region a strong interest in seeing that the remaining air-based forces continue to couple deterrence in the center and the south.

ARMS CONTROL

The Foreign Ministry does not share the concern common in Italian military circles that CFE threatens to leave Italian forces (particularly air forces) in an inferior position with regard to potential adversaries in North Africa. If nothing else, it is argued that the money to support modernized forces of the current size (or larger) will simply not be available even in the absence of air reductions under CFE. There was also some suggestion that aircraft might have to be dropped from the CFE agenda to increase the chance for an early agreement.

"Cascading" or the transfer of CFE-surplus equipment within alliances is favored, but transfers outside NATO or the Warsaw Pact are a very different matter. The principal concern in this case would be the sale of Soviet equipment to Libya or Syria (the transfer of U.S. tanks to Egypt is viewed as setting an unfortunate precedent in this respect). In the event, such transfers would be difficult to control; for example, little prevents the Soviet Union from shifting equipment beyond the Urals before CFE with a view toward selling it in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Italy has specific nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missile concerns in relation to the Middle East and the Maghreb and favors a total ban on chemical weapons. Achieving an agreement on the latter is now a particular interest of Prime Minister Andreotti.

Italy has consistently opposed the idea of naval arms control, but there is growing recognition that it may be on the horizon. If naval arms contr.. does come, ideally it will be possible to substantially reduce the number of Soviet attack submarines. This would serve Italian interests but would leave the problem of North African navies with their potent capabilities.

SECURITY STRUCTURES

The public and official consensus on the importance of NATO has grown in the face of uncertainty about the future political and security environment in Europe. Italian attitudes on this subject are strongly influenced by the perception that NATO membership has been of enormous symbolic value to the country in international affairs, providing a vehicle for reconciling the tensions between the Atlantic, European, and Mediterranean strands of Italian policy. Nonetheless, the dramatic changes in Europe have everywhere led to a general reassessment of the role and value of the Alliance, and Italy cannot insulate itself from this process. There is mounting discussion of NATO as a transitional arrangement leading to the establishment of a broader collective security system in Europe.

For the most part, Italian officials and observers wish to see rapid progress on CSCE, while admitting that the first order of business for CSCE as an institution will be assuring stability in central and eastern Europe, an objective in which Italy has an important stake. Putting Mediterranean issues on the CSCE agenda will not be an easy matter but might be encouraged through a special substructure, a CSCM (which Italy supports), or the greater involvement of Germany in Mediterranean affairs (which would help link approaches to security in Europe's center and south). Indeed, German interests already exist in relation to immigration policy, trade, and energy. German aircraft have been training at facilities in Sardinia, and an expanded aero-naval presence in the Mediterranean, perhaps on a rotating basis, is a possibility for the future. Several commentators mentioned the growing willingness in Bonn to envision an out-of-area role for Germany. The suggestion of German engagement on Mediterranean questions is somewhat surprising given the rather cool attitude toward reunification in many quarters.⁸

⁸The discussion on this point took place in an unofficial setting and may not reflect prevailing attitudes at the official level.

V. GREECE

CONSERVATIVE TRANSITION

Our meetings in Greece were held just a few weeks after the election of a conservative New Democracy (ND) government. Although the new government faces daunting domestic challenges and rules with the slimmest majority of one seat in Parliament, there is widespread optimism about Greek prospects on the foreign and security policy fronts. After a year or more of political paralysis, which effectively prevented the formation of policy on key issues involving the United States, Turkey, and the EC, the new Mitsotakis government is moving rapidly to resolve longstanding questions and restore Greek credibility in Europe and across the Atlantic.

The ND majority in Parliament is, in fact, more secure than figures might indicate, at least for the moment, since the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) under Papandreu has been losing ground steadily over the past year and probably will not wish to risk a new election any time soon. An immense budget deficit, coupled with growing pressure from the EC to reduce spending, will compel a stringent policy of austerity for the next few years, and PASOK in opposition is perfectly willing to allow ND to proceed along this unpopular path. For this reason, and in the nearterm, the opposition is also unlikely to provoke a crisis over the reorientation of Greek policy on bases, alliance relations, or cooperation against terrorism.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

Many Greek observers share the perception, common in Portugal and Turkey, that developments in Eastern Europe will lure the attention of investors, politicians, and strategists away from the Mediterranean. Yet Greece is not nearly as vulnerable to this expected diversion of attention as Turkey, and one senses an awareness of this fact in conversations with Greek observers. In a country where security policy is driven principally by the perception of the Turkish threat, such

considerations are never very far from the surface (this approach is, of course, mirrored to some extent in Turkish attitudes, although not on the same scale).

The conservative government is very keen to promote Greece's integration within the EC and to make Europe the focus of political activity. This is not, on the whole, very different from the line taken by PASOK in recent years (over time, PASOK adopted the ND approach in this as in other areas), but the Mitsotakis government can be expected to play a more active and cooperative role--beyond that of a regional aid recipient. On the whole, the Greek political elite would prefer not to see a formal expansion of the EC eastward, despite a strong interest in promoting stability and development in the Balkans. This also applies to the issue of Turkey's application for membership, which Greece has traditionally opposed. Ironically, as the prospects for Turkish membership have declined, there is growing interest in some quarters in Greece in promoting the Turkish application as a means of "anchoring" Turkey within a Western institution. This notion, analogous in many ways to thinking on Germany, is seen to be all the more attractive as the Greek and Turkish roles in NATO decline in importance. However, this is not yet the prevailing view in Greece as a whole.

Overall, the mood is one of considerable optimism, but not without a perception that the importance that has been accorded Greece in international affairs as a consequence of the Cold War (beginning with the Truman Doctrine) cannot be sustained in an era of East-West disengagement, and indeed has been steadily evaporating for some time. Europe, and particularly the EC, now provides the main forum for the expression of Greek national interests, together with the preservation of bilateral ties to the United States, clearly essential for the promotion of Greek security with regard to Turkey.

RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

The Mitsotakis government has made clear that it wishes to restore the momentum for improved relations with Turkey, building on the Papandreu-Ozal talks at Davos. With both of these personalities now gone from the scene, at least officially, there is an interest in pursuing discussions at a variety of levels to capitalize on the "Davos spirit."

On the negative side, the perception of a Turkish threat remains high, and the new climate in Europe will make it possible for Greece to shift additional resources and attention to this quarter. The possibility of growing Turkish alienation from the West is seen as an ominous sign, only partially offset by the obvious and growing gap between Greece and Turkey, both politically and economically, as Greece becomes more fully integrated within Europe.

Perhaps most troubling is the shift, acknowledged in both countries, of the focus of the Greek-Turkish dispute from issues of sovereignty in the Aegean to the problem of ethnic frictions in Thrace. Whereas the former have always been to some extent amenable to rational discourse and compromise between governments, the latter are, as in Cyprus, driven by the emotions of residents whose behavior may not be subject to official control. The rapid growth of the Turkish (the Greek government prefers the term Moslem) population in underdeveloped northwest Thrace, coupled with Greek efforts to redress the balance by settling newly arrived Soviet emigres (ethnic Greeks from the Pontus) in the region, could well result in a new "Cyprus". In any case, the problem of crisis management between Greece and Turkey is becoming more rather than less complex, despite the apparently sincere interest of both governments in improved relations.

THE BALKANS

In contrast to the overthrow of the old order elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the political revolutions in Bulgaria and Rumania are in large measure incomplete. In Albania, signs of dissent have yet to give way to serious change, and the future of Yugoslavia as a federal entity is

highly uncertain.¹ All of this is of direct concern to Greece, which has a strong stake in the stability of the region and hopes to play an active role in Balkan affairs.

To a great extent, Greek concerns spring from the perception that the de facto disintegration of the Warsaw Pact has left a political vacuum in the Balkans that Turkey might wish to exploit. The problem of the Turkish minority is most pronounced in Bulgaria, where Turks compose some 10 percent of the population even in the wake of the recent outflow of refugees to Turkey. Greece and Bulgaria have already begun to explore cooperation with regard to the "greater Turkish threat," and as Bulgaria looks for a new orientation in security policy Greece will be a natural partner.

The potential for Greece to play the role of a broker in the Balkans is based on its fairly good relations in the region as a whole (for example, Albania is willing to conduct a tentative dialogue with Greece, but not with Yugoslavia), as well as its membership in the EC, which confers considerable prestige and legitimacy in southeast Europe. There is, in fact, a history of recent Greek involvement in the region: Papandreu was an active proponent of a Balkan nuclear-free zone, and President Karamanlis has long been active in this area. Balkan affairs have also captured a good deal of the attention and energy of the current Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

The U.S. presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is widely seen as a stabilizing factor, minimizing regional conflicts and preventing a political and strategic vacuum that might be tempting to Turkey. The Mitsotakis government has taken definitive action to improve the tone and substance of relations with the United States on several fronts, including the negotiation of a new base agreement (signed during Secretary Cheney's visit to Athens in July 1990), and the strengthening of cooperation against international terrorism. Recognition of Israel,

¹Greek officials have expressed concern about the actions of Macedonian nationalists on both sides of the border with Yugoslavia.

and the desire to play a more positive role in NATO, should also improve the climate for bilateral relations. The reorientation of policy in these areas will strengthen the Greek position in Congress at a time when security assistance relationships are certain to come under increasing scrutiny. The inevitability of declining security assistance budgets is widely acknowledged.

The prevailing position on the subject of the U.S. presence in Europe might be characterized as supportive of considerable reductions consistent with the evolution of East-West relations. Again, there is a strong Greek interest in seeing that some U.S. forces remain, preferably in the Mediterranean, to give substance to the stabilizing role of the United States between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, the new base agreement explicitly calls on the United States to perform this function.

OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION

The issue of cooperation on security matters outside the NATO area has been a sensitive one in Greece, not least because of the close relationship with the Arab world encouraged by Papandreu. The Mitsotakis government is certain to be less sensitive on this point, but the problem of out-of-area cooperation will remain and perhaps grow as the Soviet threat continues to wane. The proximity to North Africa and the Middle East of the naval base at Suda Bay on Crete reinforces its value as a deterrent, but the use of this facility in a non-NATO contingency would be a very difficult issue for Athens. Over time, public opinion may well evolve in a positive direction on this matter, especially if Greek policy can be placed firmly in the context of a broader EC or NATO security mandate.

As noted, one area in which Greek policy has already begun to evolve is that of closer cooperation on the prevention of terrorism. Here the attitude of Athens can be expected to follow much more closely that of its EC and NATO partners than had been the case under PASOK.

ARMS CONTROL

With regard to nuclear forces in Europe, the Greek government favors the reduction of these weapons to the "lowest safe level." While in power, PASOK was not inclined to emphasize the issue of nuclear weapons in Greece, despite the promotion of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. On this, as on the issue of bases, Papandreu's policy tended to be more moderate than his rhetoric. In opposition, it is possible that PASOK will be less restrained.

The principal Greek interest at the moment is to ensure that the CFE process, including the cascading of equipment, does not threaten the maintenance of the regional balance between Greece and Turkey. To this end, Greek policymakers and observers are firm on the inclusion of the port of Mersin (from which the bulk of Turkish forces for the invasion of Cyprus were embarked in 1974) within the CFE area--that is, outside the Turkish exclusion zone. The existence of adequate provisions for verification in the Turkish exclusion zone and the application of the 7:10 principle to cascading are further interests.

Greek planners do not envision proportional cuts under CFE, so the perceived effect on air force modernization plans is minimal. At the same time, they are optimistic about the prospects for acquiring additional aircraft (e.g., F-4s) and tanks (M-60s) through cascading. The general trend, as elsewhere, is for an overall reduction in defense spending, a clear necessity given the alarming size of the Greek budget deficit.² This is likely to be achieved through a reduction in manpower (there is now a serious movement to reduce the length of compulsory military service) while protecting procurement plans. The objective is to develop smaller, more flexible, and more efficient forces.

There is a general perception that it will be difficult to continue to exclude naval arms control from ongoing conventional force negotiations and that a closer examination of the issue is warranted within the Alliance. In the Aegean context, amphibious ships and forces are potentially as difficult an issue as attack submarines.

²In the fall of 1990, the deficit stood at \$6.5 billion, or 10 percent of GNP.

SECURITY STRUCTURES

As in Spain, the new government is making a rather belated effort to expand its participation in NATO just as the Alliance as a whole is undergoing a crisis of relevance. In this context, it is reported that the initial round of senior military appointments made by the Mitsotakis government draws heavily on officers with NATO experience. Similarly, the longstanding plan to establish a new Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) at Larissa may finally proceed, even as the Warsaw Pact threat to Thrace evaporates.

Athens is supportive of the CSCE process and does not wish to link progress in this area to an agreement in CFE. Perhaps as a consequence of the fact that Greece is in the EC and Turkey is not (and very unlikely to be), and possibly because of the considerable prestige and influence the EC possesses in the Balkans, Greek observers tend to highlight the potential security role of the Community in Europe.

The notion of a CSCE for the Mediterranean is greeted with intellectual interest but little enthusiasm, precisely because it is the involvement of the major European powers and the United States in eastern Mediterranean affairs that provides the best guarantee of Greek security. It is thought that a separate regional initiative, while useful on some matters, cannot fill this central role.³

³To date, this function has been performed by Greek membership in NATO, and more recently the EC, together with the bilateral relationship with the United States; taken together these institutional links are very much in the tradition of the ties to Western Europe that played such an important role in the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830).

VI. TURKEY

CONSEQUENCES OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

There is growing concern both inside and outside Turkey that the end of the Cold War, the declining importance of NATO, and the dim prospects for Turkish membership in the EC have fostered a sense of isolation in Turkey not unlike that felt by the Soviet Union in the current environment. Ankara is perhaps the only place in the Alliance where one can still hear about the Soviet threat. Elsewhere in the Southern Region, the revolutionary changes in Europe are welcomed, with concern in some quarters about possible negative repercussions for investment or security assistance. In Turkey, these changes are also welcomed in principle but with a clear sense that they are fundamentally corrosive of the Turkish world view as it has existed since 1945, politically, economically, and strategically. If the importance of NATO as an institutional link to the West declines, Spain, Portugal, and Greece have the attractive alternative of the EC close at hand. Spain and Italy are in a position to lead broader regional or European initiatives in their own right (e.g., cooperation in the western Mediterranean). Turkey can only fall back on the bilateral relationship with the United States, also threatened by its Cold War character, or turn its attention to the Middle East and Central Asia, orientations fraught with both internal and external complications.

It is impossible to fully characterize the nature of this debate in Turkey within the terms of this document. Suffice it to say that the feeling that the West has "let Turkey down," and here the friction over the Armenian issue also comes into play, has begun to stimulate a reassessment of Turkey's orientation in foreign and security policy, with serious implications for the future of the secular, western-looking, tradition that has dominated Turkish politics since Ataturk. Among the political and security policy elite there is as yet little indication of a desire to distance Turkey from Europe and the United States. The real question, which this same elite frankly acknowledges,

is whether Turkish public opinion and an increasingly vocal fundamentalist movement will permit the continuation of business as usual.

The traditionally close ties between Turkey and Germany, dating back to the 19th century, lend a special quality to Turkish perceptions of German reunification and its consequences. The notion of a united Germany is widely applauded, but German preoccupation with the political and economic integration of eastern Germany is seen as inevitable. Also inevitable is the effect this will have on economic and security assistance to Turkey, as well as the level of private investment. To this one must add the fear that the changing demographic situation in Germany will jeopardize the position of the million-plus Turkish guest workers, whose ability to work abroad has served as an important social and economic safety-valve, and whose remittances represent a considerable source of foreign exchange.¹ By contrast, the prospect of more Germans eager to visit Turkey as tourists, while welcomed, hardly offsets the potentially substantial negative consequences of reunification for Turkey.

REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE SOVIET UNION

One is constantly reminded that Turkey must continue to live with the geopolitical reality of Soviet power on its border. Turkish strategists and planners are particularly cautious on the issue of CFE and its effects on the military balance. There is, or should be, a clear Turkish interest in the preservation of stability and central control in the Soviet Union. It is argued that the most explosive nationalist movements in the Soviet Union are in the south, in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Many of these areas are predominantly Turkic, and instability there can excite powerful pan-Turkish sentiments in the adjacent parts of Turkey and in certain political quarters.

¹By the end of the century, Turkey's population is likely to reach 80 million.

As in Thrace, popular emotion can threaten to outstrip the ability of Ankara to distance itself from disturbances in the southern Soviet Union. The most difficult problem from the Turkish perspective would arise from an independent Armenia with territorial claims on Turkey. Such a situation, it is feared, could jeopardize Turkish relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. On the positive side, the reform of economic systems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is seen as creating new markets for Turkish exports; Soviet Central Asia is frequently mentioned as an area of particular opportunity.

REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

With the decline of a direct threat from the Warsaw Pact and the deterioration of the political and military situation in the Middle East, there is a perception that Syria, Iraq, and Iran (in roughly that order) will pose an increasing security problem for Turkey. The contributing factors in this regard include the general growth of conventional arsenals in Syria and Iraq, the proliferation of chemical weapons and nuclear technology and the means of delivering such weapons at considerable range, and the militarization of Turkey's neighbors, particularly Iraq, as a result of the Gulf War. To these one might add the potential for friction over access to the water resources of the Euphrates posed by Turkey's Southeast Anatolia Project (the Ataturk Dam) and the support given to Kurdish insurgents operating in Turkey by Syria and Iraq. Some observers also see an Iranian hand in the recent revival of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey.

Senior Turkish officers and officials are keen to point out the extensive and growing use of oil pipelines across Turkey, including those terminating in Iskenderun Bay adjacent to the port of Mersin, for the export of Iraqi oil. Since roughly half of Europe's oil now arrives by the Mediterranean route, bypassing Hormuz and the Cape, the security of the pipelines and related facilities is an important issue for Turkey and, as the Turks are quick to point out, for the West as a whole.² Another notable aspect of this trend is the potential leverage it gives Turkey in its relations with Iraq.

²This figure is for transit through the Mediterranean as a whole, including Suez.

Without dismissing the possibility of instability in the southern Soviet Union affecting Turkey, or the potential for conflict with Greece, there is an emerging consensus that the most serious threats to Turkish security in the future will lie in the Middle East. The most likely source of difficulty in this regard is probably Syria, with its territorial claims on Antioch and alleged support for the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) insurgents.

REGIONAL SECURITY: GREECE AND THE BALKANS

As in Greece, there is broad support for the continuation and deepening of the Davos process launched by Ozal and Papandreu. There is also an awareness that the growing centrality of ethnic issues in Thrace will pose new challenges for crisis management between Ankara and Athens.

The conservative transition in Greece, hailed elsewhere in NATO, is greeted with some reservation in Ankara, precisely because the Mitsotakis government will presumably be able to count on greater support within the EC and the Alliance and thus may be tempted to adopt a more aggressive line toward Turkey. Leaving aside the accuracy of this perception, it is certainly true that Turkey stands to lose a great deal more than Greece does as a result of the changes in Europe. The new base agreement between the United States and Greece has also drawn criticism from Ankara as reflecting an unjustified bias in U.S. policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean. Throughout, one is aware of a close connection between Turkish fears of isolation in the new political and strategic environment and perceptions of Turkey's standing in relation to Greece.

Turkey looks to the Balkans with great interest in light of recent events. Turkish interests in the Balkans derive from traditional ties dating from the Ottoman period; the existence of substantial Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greek Thrace; and the role of the region as Turkey's main transit route to central Europe. As in the Caucasus, it is hoped that economic liberalization will offer opportunities for Turkish enterprises in the Balkans. Yet, given the

prevailing environment of ethnic friction, particularly in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia where the Turkish minority has been subject to repression, it is difficult to imagine a large role for Turkey emerging in the short-term; over the longer term, perhaps.

The potential for instability in the Balkans is of obvious concern to Turkish political and security elites. There is a strong interest in promoting political cooperation in the Balkans, but the fact that Greece and Bulgaria are pursuing their own form of cooperation, largely in response to a perceived threat from Turkey, limits opportunities in this area. The poor prospects for Turkish membership in the EC also cast doubt on Turkey's ability to act as a catalyst for cooperation in the Balkans where a more active EC role is sought.

FUTURE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS

In the prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty, Turkish officials are anxious to reassert the value of the United States-Turkish strategic relationship. The Turkish elite is just beginning to focus on the question of the context for this relationship in a post-Cold War world. The "value" of Turkey is still described in terms of its role as a bulwark against a revived Soviet threat and as a useful base for verification activities under CFE and START. The importance of Turkey as an actor in the Middle East and its relevance to the security of the oil-producing states and Israel are mentioned of course, but not without some hesitation. Turkish policymakers must tread a fine line between their relationship with the United States and their interests and relations in the Arab world, a balance they have maintained very skillfully since 1945. At no point was it suggested that the longstanding base relationship with the United States was in jeopardy, despite the frank admission that security assistance to Turkey is bound to decline (a possible reduction of 25-30 percent or more was cited).

The perception that Turkey has long been treated unfairly at the political level in the United States and Europe, particularly in the U.S. Congress, is a pervasive one. The experience of the 1974 arms embargo is still very much in mind, and the more recent controversy over

the Armenian issue is the source of much frustration and dismay. In brief, it is believed that the wording of President Bush's statement on the Armenian genocide implicates the modern Turkish state as well as the Ottoman government and thereby sets a dangerous precedent with regard to U.S. policy should an independent Armenia emerge in the future. Overall, one has the impression that if the EC were prepared to offer Turkey the prospect of membership, Turkish attitudes toward the bilateral relationship with the United States might be rather different. In the event, and although many Turks remain optimistic on membership, at least officially, the EC has adopted a very discouraging stance; and in this climate few Turks are prepared to openly undercut the relationship with their principal ally.

One argument heard elsewhere in Europe, but not in Turkey, is that the Armenian issue will remain an impediment to Turkish policy internationally, influencing attitudes in the EC as well as Congress, and can be overcome only by the direct acknowledgment of the Turkish government. Thus, it is argued that in an era in which the Soviet Union can admit Katyn, and the former German Democratic Republic could admit the Holocaust, surely Turkey can acknowledge events of the Ottoman period. For a variety of reasons closely bound up with Turkish political culture and perceptions, an admission of this sort is most unlikely. The Armenian issue is therefore likely to persist as an obstacle to relations on both sides of the Atlantic.

CROTONE

Senior officials and officers are clear in their support for a continued U.S. tactical air presence in the Southern Region and stress the importance of proceeding with the construction at Crotone. From the Turkish perspective, the maintenance of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (many of whose aircraft are earmarked for the reinforcement of Turkey) in Europe is essential to the deterrence of a residual Soviet threat as well as potential Syrian or Iraqi aggression, and would reinforce political and strategic ties at a time when Turkey faces increasing isolation.

OUT-OF-AREA COOPERATION

On the prospects for U.S. access to facilities in Turkey or the granting of overflight rights in non-NATO contingencies, one needs to distinguish between the opinion of Turkish leaders and strategists, many of whom support closer cooperation on out-of-area questions, and Turkish public opinion (and the press), which is overwhelmingly opposed to giving the United States a freer hand in this regard. Overall, the outlook for expanded cooperation is not good, even if the Alliance as a whole begins to examine new initiatives in this area. This is a sensitive issue throughout the Southern Region, but nowhere more so than in Turkey where the need to balance relations between NATO and the Middle East is an imperative. Turkish officials are thus placed in the anomalous position of emphasizing the growing dangers of their "neighborhood," while adopting a very cautious attitude toward cooperation on security matters in the Middle East.

ARMS CONTROL

Just as Turkish observers are almost unique in the Alliance in stressing the continuing Soviet threat to their territory, the prevailing Turkish view of CFE is distinctly conservative. Ankara's interest in the current negotiations is to assure that an agreement promoting stability in central Europe does not alter regional balances in a way that might harm Turkish security. The balances at issue are those with Greece; Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors, particularly Syria; and the forces stationed in the Soviet Union itself opposite Eastern Anatolia. The Turkish "exclusion zone" under CFE is relevant to the balances with both Syria and Greece (again, the disposition of the port of Mersin within the zone is a source of friction). There is some fear that under CFE as currently envisioned, the remaining Soviet forces facing Turkey will be substantially modernized and that in any case "Turkey is much closer to the Urals." Of even greater concern is the possibility that the Soviets may now take the opportunity to cascade or, more properly, sell modern equipment outside the Warsaw Pact, possibly to Syria. Turkish officials, once quite optimistic about the prospects

for acquiring much needed modern equipment through cascading within the Alliance, are now less sanguine, especially with regard to tactical aircraft.

The outcome of CFE is anxiously awaited in light of the active debate in Turkey on the proper size, character, and purpose of the armed forces. The authorized strength of the Turkish forces has always been high, roughly 600,000 plus. Given the recent changes in the security environment, this manpower level is regarded as excessive in many quarters, and it is widely agreed that these forces should be modernized and restructured to provide for increased mobility. One obstacle in this regard is the traditional role of the military establishment in development and education; the scale of the Turkish armed forces has been dictated in part by the requirements of this social welfare function.

On naval arms control, Turkish officials share the cautious NATO line, but influential individuals both inside and outside the military are willing to consider the idea if it embraces the Black Sea as well as the Mediterranean. Again, support for initiatives in this area would be contingent on the nature of the details (e.g., Turkey does have an interest in limiting amphibious forces). To the extent that naval arms control is seen to work against the continued U.S. presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish enthusiasm for reductions in maritime forces will be limited.

SECURITY STRUCTURES, A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH

Turks are worried by what they perceive as a European tendency to consider security only in Central Front terms. Of all the Southern Region allies, Turkey has perhaps the most to lose from the waning of established security structures--NATO and the bilateral relationship with the United States--not only because these arrangements have clearly served Turkish interests very well both materially and symbolically, but also because there is nothing to replace them. Turkey does not have a European option. Thus, Turkey continues to emphasize the NATO dimension of its policy and will be a cooperative if wary participant in CSCE.

The notion of a CSCM for the Mediterranean is widely perceived as a non-starter and a convenient vehicle for the promotion of Spanish, French, and Italian political ambitions. Turkish observers are not unique in measuring the worth of proposed security structures in terms of the extent to which they promote a continued U.S. role in Eurasia, but they are distinctive in their degree of concern on this point.

VII. SOME OVERALL OBSERVATIONS

It is impossible to ignore the effect of specific national perspectives on issues facing the Southern Region and, indeed, the Alliance as a whole. However, there are still some areas of interest and concern common across the region.

1. *The Mediterranean is a center of important residual (post-Cold War) security concerns.* Perceived security and security-related problems arising from North Africa, the Balkans, or the Middle East have always existed in the Southern Region. The waning of the Soviet threat and uncertainty about the future of existing security structures have encouraged attention to regional issues and at the same time removed the traditional context (containment) for addressing them. Moreover, this is not simply a question of shifting attention. In many areas--growing conventional and unconventional arsenals in the Middle East and North Africa, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and increasing demographic pressure across the Mediterranean, and instability flowing from political change in the Balkans--conditions have simply changed or reverted to more traditional patterns. For most of the countries surveyed, there has been a real growth in the perception of a non-shared threat.

2. *Arguably, the importance of the Mediterranean to Europe's overall security is increasing.* In theory, this suggests that NATO (and/or CSCE) ought to devote greater energy and resources to problems originating in the south. In reality, the rapid pace of change in Europe has already led to a diversion of political and economic attention from the Southern Region to Eastern Europe and potentially the Soviet Union. On the strategic front, the effect has been less pronounced largely because of the tangible problems mentioned above; but Southern Region countries still fear the tendency, most pronounced in Europe, to view security in Central Front terms.

3. *The linkage between CFE and security is least automatic in the Southern Region.* Because the Southern Region allies face, to varying degrees, latent or actual threats to their security outside the East-West relationship, they tend to exhibit a conservative attitude toward arms control initiatives that might alter regional balances (e.g., between Spain and Morocco, Italy and Libya, Greece and Turkey, or Turkey and its Arab neighbors). Since most of the Southern Region countries have ambitious modernization plans, they are also wary of arms control approaches that would inhibit the acquisition of more modern forces and defense-industrial development, including the notion of proportional reductions.

4. *The U.S. presence continues to be important under conditions of uncertainty.* The Southern Region countries have a keen interest in preserving the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean (and in the case of Portugal, in the Azores and the Atlantic approaches) as a stabilizing factor in regional affairs. They also share a transcendent interest in NATO and the U.S. presence as a means of binding together the security fate of Europe as a whole, and as a means of avoiding the "marginalization" of their security concerns. One might suggest that this emphasis exists in inverse proportion to the extent of a country's integration and importance within the EC. Italy does worry about keeping the United States engaged in the Mediterranean, but it does so from a broader European perspective. To a degree, the same is true of Spain. At the opposite extreme, Turkey, lacking the institutional alternative of Europe, has the most obvious stake in existing security structures and deployments, especially those involving U.S. forces.

5. *The evolution of an increasingly European view is a factor that will influence the nature of U.S. relations around the region in the future.* With the exception of Turkey (and Italy, whose policy has always had a strong European dimension), the attitudes of the political and security policy elites in the Southern Region countries on important issues are increasingly formed in a European context. It is becoming less and less thinkable for Portugal, Spain, or Greece to adopt a stance on, for example, the U.S. use of bases in a non-NATO crisis in isolation

from its European partners. This trend has far-reaching implications for the way in which the United States considers the issue of access, even where the record has been favorable as in Portugal (it also argues strongly for a new transatlantic approach to out-of-area cooperation).

6. *Support for Crotone.* Across the Southern Region there is continuing, even increasing, support for the transfer of the 401st TFW from Torrejon to Crotone in Calabria. The tactical air presence at Crotone is seen as important because it (1) is tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to Europe, *including the Southern Region*, in a period of uncertainty regarding future security arrangements; (2) is a notable example of burdensharing; (3) contributes to the deterrence of a variety of potential threats arising from North Africa and the Middle East (although the issue of out-of-area access remains a difficult one); (4) plays a political reassurance role in relation to Turkey (this is where much of the wing would be committed to fight); and (5) provides an excellent hedge against the decline of the traditional U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean as a result of arms control or economics.¹

¹Views on Crotone could be expected to have a somewhat different character in the wake of the Gulf crisis. The perceived importance of a U.S. tactical air presence in the region would be strengthened, while concerns about a precipitous decline in U.S. naval/naval air presence in the Mediterranean would be less pronounced. Certainly, attitudes will also be shaped by the outcome of the coalition approach in the Gulf, politically as well as operationally.